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INTRODUCTION
Measure 37 creates a remedy for an injury that Oregon law did
not previously recognize: a less than total reduction in the fair
market value of one’s real property caused by land-use regula-
tions restricting its use.1  The measure authorizes both adminis-
trative and judicial remedies for that injury.  A host of questions
have arisen about the interaction of those remedies.
The measure provides that, if a challenged regulation contin-
ues to be enforced 180 days after written demand for compensa-
tion is made upon the public entity enacting or enforcing the
regulation, a claim may lie in the circuit court.  It also states that
state and local governments’ procedures for processing claims for
compensation shall not act as a “prerequisite to the filing” of
such a claim in the circuit court. Beyond that, the measure is si-
lent as to the effect, if any, of administrative decisions on claims
for compensation in circuit court.
When a governmental entity adopts and applies procedures for
the processing of claims under Measure 37 and those procedures
culminate in a decision other than waiver of the regulation, what
* The author is an appellate lawyer and business litigator in the Portland, Oregon,
office of Harrang Long Gary Rudnick, PC.  She received her B.A. at Portland State
University and her J.D. at the University of California at Berkeley, School of Law
(Boalt Hall).  She is admitted to practice in Oregon and California.
1 See  Coast Range Conifers, LLC v. State ex rel.  Or. State Bd. of Forestry, 339
Or. 136, 117 P.3d 990 (2005) (holding that state wildlife nesting regulation which
prevented logging company from logging approximately nine acres of its 40-acre
parcel did not effect a “taking” because the property considered as a whole still had
economically viable use, and declining to extend Boise Cascade Corp. v. Bd. of For-
estry , 325 Or. 185, 198, 935 P.2d 411 (1997), which held that a complaint alleging
deprivation of the only economically viable use of approximately 50 acres of a 64-
acre parcel stated a takings claim under the Oregon Constitution).
[329]
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is the effect of that decision on a subsequent claim for compensa-
tion in the circuit court?  This article examines some of the issues
pertinent to that question.
GOVERNMENTAL PROCEDURES AUTHORIZED BY MEASURE 37
Measure 37 authorizes state and local governments to apply
existing procedures or to adopt new ones to process claims for
the newly cognizable injury (that is, the reduction in the fair mar-
ket value of real property caused by restrictions on its use).2
Processing of such claims will require determinations as to
whether the challenged land-use regulation is excluded from the
measure’s coverage;3 whether the claim is timely; whether the
claimant owns the property; whether the challenged land-use
regulation restricts the property’s use; whether it was enacted
before the owner or the owner’s family acquired the property;
and whether it has caused a reduction in the property’s fair mar-
ket value.4  Measure 37 vests in the public entity discretion to pay
compensation or to modify, remove, or not apply the regulation.5
Many local governments have adopted procedures for ad-
ministering claims for compensation under Measure 37, as have
Metro (a metropolitan service district),6 and the Department of
Administrative Services of the State of Oregon.7  Those proce-
dures generally are designed to result in decisions focused solely
on the rights and duties of the particular claimant or claimants,
and they require the decision making body to apply established
criteria to particular facts.  Agency decisions reached by applying
preexisting criteria to concrete facts and “directed at a closely
circumscribed factual situation or a relatively small number of
2 Measure 37 § 7, available at  http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/
meas/m37_text.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2006).
3 Regulations excluded from the measure’s coverage include those that are re-
quired by federal law, that restrict or prohibit public nuisances or other activities for
the protection of public health and safety, and that prohibit nude dancing or the sale
of pornography. Measure 37, supra  note 2, § 3.
4 Measure 37, supra  note 2, §§ 1-2.
5 Measure 37, supra  note 2, § 8.
6 The Metropolitan Services District’s Council adopted Ordinance No. 05-1087A,
effective Dec. 23, 2005, codified at Metro Code, Or., Code § 2.21 (2005), available at
http://www.metro-region.org/library_docs/about/chap2.21.pdf.
7 See , e.g. , OR. ADMIN. R.  125-145(0010)-(0105) (2006) (guide for state agencies
processing claims under Measure 37), available at  http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/rules/
OARS_100/OAR_125/125_145.html.
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persons”8 are generally characterized as “quasi-judicial”
decisions.
CONTEXT: ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
AND WRIT OF REVIEW
Certain quasi-judicial decisions are made by state agencies,
which are governed by Oregon’s Administrative Procedures Act
(APA).  The APA establishes a comprehensive pattern for judi-
cial review of those decisions.  The APA distinguishes between
two types of final orders: “orders in a contested case” and “or-
ders in other than a contested case.”9  To be considered a “con-
tested case,” the decision must have been reached after a hearing
with certain formalities.10  Measure 37 does not require, nor ordi-
narily do the administrative rules provide for, a hearing.  There-
fore, state agency decisions in Measure 37 claims are most likely,
at least at the outset, to be viewed as “orders in other than a
contested case.”
The APA provides that “[j]udicial review of final orders of
agencies shall be solely as provided by [the APA].”11  Accord-
ingly, many Oregon cases hold that the APA provides the exclu-
sive avenue for obtaining judicial review of decisions by state
agencies.12  For example, a party may not circumvent the exclu-
sive APA review process by filing a declaratory judgment
action.13
Under the APA, when the circuit court reviews an order in
other than a contested case, its role is not to determine the facts
de novo. The scope and contents of the record are determined by
the circuit court, and may include evidence that was not before
the agency.14  However, the court is limited to reviewing for er-
8 Strawberry Hill 4 Wheelers v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 287 Or. 591, 602-03, 601 P.2d 769
(1979).
9 OR. REV. STAT. § 183.482 (2003) (jurisdiction for review of contested cases); OR.
REV. STAT. § 183.484 (2005) (jurisdiction for review of orders other than contested
cases).
10 OR. REV. STAT. § 183.310(2)(a) (2005).
11 OR. REV. STAT. § 183.480(2) (2005).
12 See , e.g. , Eppler v. Bd. of Tax Serv. Examiners, 189 Or. App. 216, 222, 75 P.3d
900, 903 (2003).
13 Pen-Nor, Inc. v. Or. Dept. of Higher Educ., 87 Or. App. 305, 308, 742 P.2d 643,
645 (1987).
14 Id.  at 644-49, 996 P.2d at 960-63.
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rors of law, including whether there is substantial evidence in the
whole record to support the agency’s decision.15
Decisions by cities, counties, districts, and other “municipal
corporations” in the exercise of their quasi-judicial authority are
subject to writ of review procedures, codified at ORS 34.010 et
seq .16  The writ of review statutes provide that quasi-judicial de-
cisions by cities, counties, districts, or other “municipal corpora-
tions” in the transaction of municipal corporation business are
subject to judicial review only  as provided in the writ of review
statutes.17  When writ of review is available, it is the exclusive
remedy for challenging such a decision.18  The writ of review stat-
utes exclude from their coverage certain defined types of land-
use decisions.19  Decisions by governing bodies under Measure
37 are, by the express terms of the measure, not considered to be
such land-use decisions.20
It follows from the foregoing that, to the extent that a city,
county, district, or other municipal corporation makes decisions
in response to Measure 37 claims for compensation in the exer-
cise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions, the exclusive avenue
for judicial review of those decisions would be under the writ of
review procedures—unless Measure 37 is interpreted as modify-
ing or replacing those remedies.
In a writ of review proceeding, the circuit court may review the
jurisdictional, procedural, legal, or constitutional bases of the
challenged decision, but the court does not determine the facts
anew .21 Instead, it determines whether the decision-making
15 Polaski v. Clark, 158 Or. App. 166, 171, 973 P.2d 381, 383-84 (1999) (explaining
the general scope of review in a case other than a contested case).
16 OR. REV. STAT. § 34.010 (2005).
17 Under OR REV. STAT. § 34.020(2):
“[A]ny party to any process or proceeding before or by any inferior court, officer, or
tribunal may have the decision or determination thereof reviewed for errors, as pro-
vided in ORS 34.010 to 34.100, and not otherwise.”
OR. REV. STAT. § 34.020(2) (2005).
18 A person who may challenge a governmental decision by writ of review may
not, for example, bring an action for a declaratory judgment regarding that decision.
State ex rel. City of Powers v. Coos County Airport Dist., 201 Or. App. 222, 229, 119
P.3d 225, 228 (2005).
19 OR. REV. STAT. § 34.102(2) (2005).
20 Measure 37, supra  note 2, § 9.
21 The writ may be allowed where the decision-making body appears to have:
“(a) Exceeded its jurisdiction;
“(b) Failed to follow the procedure applicable to the matter before it;
“(c) Made a finding or order not supported by substantial evidence in the whole
record;
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body’s finding or order is supported by substantial evidence.
With few exceptions, its review is confined to the record made
before the inferior tribunal.22  In the words of the Oregon Su-
preme Court:
[T]he reviewing court should not allow new evidence or hold
evidentiary hearings.  The only possible justification for the
continued existence of writs of review is that the procedure is
fast and simple.  Allowing evidence outside the record would
change the nature of the proceeding and expand the scope of a
writ of review beyond the statutory authorization.23
The APA and writ of review statutes make it clear that the
agencies covered by each of them have the right and responsibil-
ity to decide matters within their respective jurisdictions.  Those
administrative procedures must be pursued before the claimant
can resort to the courts.  However, even when applicable statutes
are silent as to those questions, courts may invoke the doctrines
of “primary jurisdiction” or “exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies” to require completion of administrative procedures before
relief is sought in the courts.24  Both doctrines were originally
created by the courts to allocate the initial responsibility for
resolving disputes between courts and agencies. The application
“(d) Improperly construed the applicable law; or
“(e) Rendered a decision that is unconstitutional.”
OR. REV. STAT. § 34.040 (2005).
22 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 34.020, 34.040 (2005).  Under certain limited circumstances,
a record may be supplemented or the reviewing court may remand for further pro-
ceedings.  Alt v. City of Salem, 306 Or. 80, 84, 756 P.2d 637, 640 (1988).  Courts will
not consider substantive issues outside the record below, but they may take addi-
tional evidence on procedural issues (e.g. standing or lack of notice). See  First Com-
merce of America, Inc. v. Nimbus Center Assoc., 329 Or. 199, 207, 986 P.2d 556, 560
(1999) (allowing party to present new evidence related to justiciability when facts
were not in dispute).  However, appellate courts are not required to admit such ad-
ditional evidence. Hood River Valley Residents’ Comm., Inc. v. Bd. of County
Comm’rs of Hood River County, 193 Or. App. 485, 505, 91 P.3d 748, 759 (2004).
23 Alt , 306 Or. at 84-85, 756 P.2d. at 640.
24 Boise Cascade Corp. v. Bd. of Forestry, 325 Or. 185, 191, 935 P.2d 411, 417
(1997).  The court stated:
There is no fixed formula for determining whether an agency has primary
jurisdiction over a dispute or an issue raised in a dispute.  In making such
determinations, courts consider several factors, including (1) the extent to
which the agency’ specialized expertise makes it a preferable forum for
resolving the issue, (2) the need for uniform resolution of the issue, and (3)
the potential that judicial resolution of the issue will have an adverse im-
pact on the agency’s performance of its regulatory responsibilities.
Id.  at 192, 935 P.2d at 417 (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis and Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
II, Administrative Law Treatise § 14.1, at 272 (3d ed. 1994)).
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of both doctrines may be mandated by statute, but neither is de-
pendent on statutory authority.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GOVERNMENTAL PROCEDURES
UNDER MEASURE 37
Questions have arisen about whether, or to what extent, Mea-
sure 37’s “cause of action for compensation . . . in circuit court”25
may trump the exclusive remedy provisions of the APA and writ
of review statutes.  Is Measure 37’s caveat that governmental
procedures shall not act as a “prerequisite” to the filing of such a
cause of action more than a statutory effort to avoid application
of the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies?  Does it mean, as some have argued, that
claimants are free to ignore governmental procedures and result-
ing quasi-judicial decisions on Measure 37 claims?  Those ques-
tions arise out of the wording of Section 7 of the measure:
A metropolitan service district, city, or county, or state agency
may adopt or apply procedures for the processing of claims
under this act, but in no event shall these procedures act as a
prerequisite to the filing of a compensation claim [in the cir-
cuit court] . . . nor shall the failure of an owner of property to
file an application for a land use permit with the local govern-
ment serve as grounds for dismissal, abatement, or delay of a
compensation claim [in the circuit court] . . . .26
Applying the methodology set forth in PGE v. Bureau of La-
bor and Industries (BOLI),27 one begins with an analysis of text
and context.  A common and ordinary meaning of the word “pre-
requisite” is: “necessary as a preliminary to a proposed effect or
end.”28  By employing the permissive word “may” rather than
the mandatory “shall,” the provision authorizes public entities to
adopt or apply procedures for the processing of Measure 37
claims, but does not require them to do so.  The measure, there-
fore, contemplates that some governmental entities may either
fail to adopt such procedures, or fail to apply them.
In that context, the proviso that, “in no event shall these proce-
dures act as a prerequisite to the filing of a compensation claim
[in circuit court]” can be understood to mean that the existence
25 Measure 37, supra  note 2, § 6.
26 Id.  § 7.
27 Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 317 Or. 606, 859 P.2d
1143 (1993).
28 WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 783 (5th ed. 1937).
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or application of the procedures themselves cannot be a neces-
sary precondition to the filing of a claim in the circuit court.  In
other words, the proviso appears to mean at least that a
nonresponsive public entity cannot defeat a claim in circuit court
by invoking the doctrines of “exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies” or “primary jurisdiction.” But does it go further than that?
ARGUMENT THAT QUASI-JUDICIAL
DECISIONS ARE IRRELEVANT
Some may argue that the measure’s requirement of timely
written demand on the public entity is like the tort claims notice
requirements imposed by the Oregon Tort Claims Act.29  Under
that view, the making of a demand is a prerequisite to the filing
of a claim in court, but the public entity’s response to such a de-
mand—other than waiver of enforcement of the challenged regu-
lation—is irrelevant.
Proponents of that view can be expected to argue that the cen-
tral purpose behind Measure 37 was to make it easier for prop-
erty owners to obtain relief from land-use regulations (either in
the form of a waiver of enforcement or compensation), and not
to give interested governmental entities an opportunity to adjudi-
cate claims.  The argument is that a cause of action for compen-
sation under Measure 37 is a “stand alone” claim that does not
involve “review” of an agency decision.  For example, when a
person brought an action against the State of Oregon for breach
of a video lottery terminal lease agreement, the Court of Appeals
held that a lottery commission order denying any obligation
under that agreement did not limit the plaintiff’s remedies to
those provided in the APA.30  The APA did not apply because
the plaintiff was not seeking review of the agency’s order termi-
nating the agreement, but was instead relying on that order to
show the defendant’s breach.31
It may be contended that, by creating a cause of action for
which administrative procedures are not a “prerequisite,” Mea-
sure 37 impliedly carved out an exception to the “exclusive rem-
edy” provisions of the APA and writ of review statutes.  Rules of
statutory construction, such as the rule that the more specific
29 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.275(1) (2005).
30 Premier Technology v. State, 136 Or. App. 124, 131-32, 901 P.2d 833, 888
(1995).
31 Id.
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statute (i.e ., Measure 37) prevails over the more general one
(i.e ., the APA and writ of review statutes),32 or the rule that the
later-enacted statute prevails may support that argument.
ARGUMENT THAT QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS ARE SUBJECT
TO JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER APA AND
WRIT OF REVIEW STATUTES
An alternative interpretation of Measure 37 is this:
Nonresponsive public entities cannot invoke the doctrines of “ex-
haustion of remedies” or “ripeness” to thwart claims for compen-
sation, but timely decisions that are the product of quasi-judicial
procedures remain subject to challenge only under the APA and
writ of review procedures. Proponents of that interpretation can
be expected to point out that the measure’s text and context are
the best indicia of voter intent. The measure states that the cause
of action for compensation it creates is “in addition to any other
remedy under the Oregon or United States Constitutions,” but
the cause of action in circuit court “is not intended to modify or
replace any other remedy.”33
Moreover, a frequently invoked maxim of statutory interpreta-
tion is that ‘the expression of one is the exclusion of another.’34
Measure 37 states that decisions of governing bodies shall not be
considered land-use decisions as defined in ORS 197.015(10).35
However, the measure contains no comparable provision exclud-
ing such decisions from the scope of the APA or writ of review
statutes.  It does not state, for example, that a decision by a city,
county, district, or other municipal corporation regarding a claim
for compensation shall not be considered a decision of such en-
tity “acting in a quasi-judicial capacity and made in the transac-
tion of municipal corporation business as defined in ORS
34.102(2)”36—decisions that are subject to judicial review only
under the writ of review procedures.
Similarly, Measure 37 does not state that a decision by a state
agency regarding a claim for compensation shall not be consid-
32 OR. REV. STAT. § 174.010(2) (2005).
33 Measure 37, supra  note 2, § 12.
34 State ex rel.  City of Powers v. Coos County Airport Dist., 201 Or. App. 222,
234, 119 P.3d 225, 231 (2005) (en banc).
35 Measure 37, supra  note 2, § 9; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 197.015(10) (2005).
36 See OR. REV. STAT. § 34.102 (2005) (explaining that decisions are subject to
judicial review only under the writ of review procedures).
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\20-2\OEL204.txt unknown Seq: 9 22-JUN-06 16:11
The Effect of Administrative Decisions under Measure 37 337
ered an order subject to judicial review only under the APA,
which allows for reversal only in limited circumstances.
Some will argue that this suggests an intent by the voters to
preserve the procedures that would otherwise apply to those de-
cisions under the APA and writ of review statutes.
As for the argument that Measure 37 impliedly repealed the
“exclusive remedies” features of the APA and writ of review stat-
utes for the purpose of compensation claims, a conclusion of im-
plied repeal “is not favored and must be established by plain,
unavoidable, and irreconcilable repugnancy between the prior
and subsequent statutes.”37
In a related vein, the Oregon Supreme Court has observed:
[W]hen one statute deals with a subject in general terms and
another [statute] deals with the same subject in a more minute
and definite way, the two should be read together and harmo-
nized, if possible, while giving effect to a consistent legislative
policy. . . . [Only] if the two statutes cannot be harmonized,
[should] “the specific statute [be] . . . considered an exception
to the general statute.”38
In this instance, Measure 37 and the remedies available under
the APA and writ of review statutes may be harmonized in this
way: If a governmental entity accepts Measure 37’s invitation to
adopt and apply procedures for administering compensation
claims, and those procedures qualify as an exercise of the
agency’s quasi-judicial authority under the APA, or of the munic-
ipal corporation’s quasi-judicial function under writ of review
statutes, the remedies under those statutes continue to apply.  If,
on the other hand, a governmental entity chooses the alternative
course contemplated by Measure 37 (that is, to refrain from
adopting or applying such procedures), an otherwise proper
claim for compensation may be filed in the circuit court.
PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF FINDINGS OF FACT
If Measure 37 is interpreted as preserving the remedies availa-
ble under the writ of review statutes, judicial review of local gov-
ernments’ quasi-judicial decisions regarding Measure 37 would
be for substantial evidence.  If the measure is instead interpreted
37 Powers, 201 Or. App. at 233, 119 P.3d at 237 (quoting City of Lowell v. Wilson,
197 Or. App. 291, 309, 105 P.3d 856, 866 (2005)).
38 Lewis v. CIGNA Ins. Co., 339 Or. 342, 349-50, 121 P.3d 1128, 1132 (2005)
(quoting State v. Guzek, 322 Or. 245, 268, 906 P.2d 262, 286 (1995).
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as modifying or replacing those remedies to provide a “stand
alone” cause of action for compensation in circuit court, the
question will soon arise as to whether findings of fact by govern-
mental decision-making bodies will be given binding effect in the
circuit court action involving identical issues.39
Oregon courts have recognized that some, but not all, types of
administrative proceedings are appropriate to establish issue
preclusion.40
Whether an administrative decision has preclusive effect de-
pends on: (1) whether the administrative forum maintains pro-
cedures that are “sufficiently formal and comprehensive”; (2)
whether the proceedings are “trustworthy”; (3) whether the
application of issue preclusion would “facilitate prompt, or-
derly and fair problem resolution”; and (4) whether the “same
quality of proceedings and the opportunity to litigate is pre-
sent in both proceedings.”41
Therefore, trial courts might give preclusive effect to public en-
tities’ findings of fact on Measure 37 claims, depending on the
nature of the procedures those entities adopt for processing
those claims.42
Parties seeking to avoid issue preclusion in the circuit court
action for compensation may argue that the nature of the pro-
39 The Oregon Supreme Court has identified five requirements essential to the
application of issue preclusion:
1. The issue in the two proceedings is identical.
2. The issue actually was litigated and was essential to a final decision on
the merits in the prior proceeding.
3. The party sought to be precluded has had a full and fair opportunity to
be heard on that issue.
4. The party sought to be precluded was a party or was in privity with a
party to the prior proceeding.
5. The prior proceeding was the type of proceeding to which this court will
give preclusive effect.
Nelson v. Emerald People’s Util. Dist., 318 Or. 99, 104, 862 P.2d 1293, 1296-97
(1993) (citations omitted).
40 Id.  at 104 n. 4 (citing N. Clackamas Sch. Dist. v. White, 305 Or. 48, 52, 750 P.2d
485, 486 (1988); State v. Ratliff, 304 Or. 254, 258, 744 P.2d 247, 249 (1987)).
41 Id.  at 104.
42 Claimants may argue that application of the doctrine of issue preclusion to the
facts in the public entities’ procedures for deciding Measure 37 claims violates the
right to a jury trial under the Oregon Constitution.  However, claimants have no
constitutional right to a jury trial on claims for compensation of the type contem-
plated by Measure 37 because such claims did not exist when the drafters wrote the
Oregon Constitution in 1857. See Jensen v. Whitlow, 334 Or. 412, 421-22, 52 P.3d
599, 603-04 (2002) (stating that the “trial by jury” provision of the Oregon Constitu-
tion simply guarantees a jury trial in civil actions for which the common law pro-
vided a jury trial when the Constitution was adopted).
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ceedings before the public entity did not afford a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue.43  They may argue that the vot-
ers did not intend issues decided by public entities to be accorded
preclusive effect in a subsequent claim for compensation in the
circuit court.  Instead, they may argue, the voters created the
cause of action for compensation in the circuit court and pro-
vided that agency procedures shall not be “prerequisites” to the
filing of such a claim.
Opponents can be expected to point out that Measure 37 could
have provided that findings made in agency proceedings are not
admissible in any action for compensation in the circuit court,
and that its silence allows for application of the usual rules of
issue preclusion.
CONCLUSION
Measure 37 recognizes a new injury and authorizes both ad-
ministrative and judicial remedies for that injury.  When two en-
tities have authority to decide the identical issues, various
procedural devices may come into play in order to serve the
goals of conserving resources, making the best use of each en-
tity’s respective area of expertise, and avoiding inconsistent deci-
sions.  Traditionally, those purposes have been served by such
doctrines as “primary jurisdiction,” “exhaustion of administrative
remedies,” and issue preclusion, as well as by such devices as the
statutory limitations on the scope of judicial review under the
APA and writ of review statutes.  A host of questions about the
application of those principles and procedures under Measure 37
now await resolution by the Oregon courts.
43 In Barackman v. Anderson , 338 Or. 365, 109 P.3d 370 (2005), the court held
that where the statute was silent on the issue, the party seeking to avoid preclusive
effect of findings in a PIP arbitration bore the burden of demonstrating that the
words of the statute reflect a legislative intent to prohibit Oregon courts from apply-
ing the doctrine of issue preclusion to arbitration decisions. Id . at 370, 109 P.3d at
373.
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